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## Ratifying Maastricht

### Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts

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#### ABSTRACT

When signing the new Treaty on European Union in Maastricht, the governmental leaders of the 12 member countries of the European Communities had accomplished a significant step towards economic and political union. Before taking effect the draft proposal had, however, to be ratified according to the procedures of the 12 member countries. We discuss and analyze these different ratification procedures by focusing on the parliamentary stage. Applying the two-level game concept of international cooperation we show that a two-dimensional representation of the Maastricht draft treaty sufficiently explains the domestic events that occurred during the ratification process. Besides extending the Maastricht negotiation win-set linking economic and political objectives, the two-dimensionality particularly increased the 12 governments' likelihood to survive the ratification constraints in their domestic arena. Using spatial solution concepts from social choice theory as tools, we attempt to illustrate with empirical data how 'big' the domestic win-sets of the 12 were in the parliamentary ratification.

#### KEY WORDS

- comparative politics
- Maastricht ratification
- two-level games
- win-set analysis

## Introduction

Unlike any previous processes, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union has forcefully illustrated that bargaining outcomes negotiated among governmental leaders may be subject to 'involuntary defection' (Iida, 1996). In the absence of perfect foresight involuntary defection may occur when a negotiated draft treaty fails to find the necessary support in the domestic arena. In most western democracies draft treaties negotiated among national governmental leaders have to find approval in the domestic arena either in parliamentary votes or in referendums. Seeking such approval for further political and economic integration in the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty proved to be rather difficult. The draft treaty and the ratification processes were challenged in courts, led to a negative referendum outcome in Denmark, almost failed in a referendum in France, and only overcame the ratification constraints in the United Kingdom after a vote of confidence.

These events clearly illustrated the second stage of the 'two-level' (Putnam, 1988) nature of international cooperation. Most two-level analyses address the bargaining problem of national governmental leaders negotiating among themselves draft treaties in the international arena (Wolf and Zangl, 1996). Knowing that at the second stage these drafts have to find approval in the domestic (parliamentary) arena, they focus on whether and how domestic constraints influence the outcome of the negotiation process (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993; Evans et al., 1993). Such an influence is particularly likely when the national ratification provisions set higher hurdles than the formation of national governments in the domestic arena itself. If the nature of the domestic constraints is fully understood by the negotiating governmental leaders, they should try to avoid involuntary defection by only settling for draft agreements that can overcome the ratification stage without raising problems for their own survival in the domestic arena.

Empirical studies of ratification processes have, however, been limited in several respects so far. Some authors employ the 'two-level game' metaphor only to highlight the importance of preferences of domestic actors. The selection of the actors covered is often unsystematic, and the measurements of their preferences remain mostly ad hoc (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998). Moreover, the interplay between these actors and the ratification hurdles are also frequently studied in a cursory manner (e.g. Milner, 1997). Addressing these limitations in the existing literature we offer a detailed study of the parliamentary ratification stage of the Maastricht Treaty in all 12 member states. We establish two major points. First, the parliamentary ratification constraints underwent important changes in several countries that were not necessarily foreseen in

the negotiating stage. This may change the set of possible treaties that could find sufficient support in the domestic parliaments for ratification. Milner (1997) discusses some of these changes in the context of her case study of the Maastricht Treaty without, however, considering all 12 member states. Second, we show that reducing a priori the Maastricht draft treaty to the single issue of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is not necessarily warranted. Allowing for a second, political, dimension to play a role in the ratification stage, we are able to show that the 12 governments increased the likelihood for domestic approval and thus for their own survival. As a result, researchers employing the two-level game concept to analyze treaty negotiations should be careful in determining the dimensionality of the political spaces employed in their explanations.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss briefly some recent work on the negotiations leading to the Maastricht draft treaty and its ratification. We attempt to highlight that there is considerable debate in the literature whether both negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty can be reduced to the single EMU-dimension. Next, we propose to study the domestic ratification processes with the help of a spatial representation, which requires taking into account all procedural provisions and preferences of the ratifying actors. We present in detail the ratification provisions for the Maastricht Treaty in the 12 member countries and show that in most countries the ratification hurdles were higher than those for government formation. In addition, some of these provisions underwent significant changes. Then, we try to determine empirically the preferences of the political parties on the draft treaty in all 12 member countries. We calculate both in the context of a one- and two-dimensional policy space the sets of proposals that could find sufficient parliamentary support to clear the ratification hurdles. The differences between the one- and two-dimensional spaces suggest that the two-dimensional analysis allows for some additional insights that are lost in the one-dimensional representation of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. We conclude by emphasizing the lessons to be learned from this analysis for future research on treaty ratification and two-level analyses of treaty bargaining.

### **The Maastricht Treaty – a one-dimensional story?**

The Maastricht Treaty appears as a significant step in the integration project of the European Union (EU). Its major innovations comprised the European Monetary Union (EMU) leading to the adoption of a single currency and a European Central Bank (De Haan, 1997; Franzese and Hall, 1998), EU foreign

policy and institutional changes affecting the role being played by the European Parliament (Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997). According to Weiler (1997: 4), it was not the content of the Treaty, not the symbolism of Maastricht's pompous entry into force but 'the public reaction, frequently and deliciously hostile' that made Maastricht 'the most important constitutional moment in the history of the European construct'. Due to the complex nature of the treaty, the literature on the Maastricht Treaty and its ratification is extremely large. Thus, we will in no way attempt to summarize this large body of work here. We will only focus on the scholarly debate whether the EMU was the single most important element in the Maastricht Treaty, and whether reducing our attention to this economic dimension of the Treaty allows us to understand the major elements of both negotiation and ratification.

Milner (1997: 203), probably mostly guided by her theoretical approach, reduces explicitly the Maastricht Treaty to the EMU component. She discusses in her case study both the negotiation and ratification phase exclusively in terms of this ambitious project leading to a single currency. Consequently, the governmental preferences in the negotiation phase and the preferences of the parliamentary actors in the ratification phase were, according to her, completely determined by the EMU dimension. Obviously, this only makes sense if the EMU can be completely separated from the remaining aspects of the Maastricht Treaty, and if the latter did not play any significant role in the ratification process.

While partly agreeing with the predominance of the EMU issue in the Maastricht Treaty, Garrett (1994) adopts two qualifications. First, he admits that the political goals that Germany brought to the bargaining table (e.g. Eastern European enlargement and to some degree German unification) were part of a deal that allowed for successful bargaining among all 12 member governments: 'In sum, the German government had powerful reasons to hope that the Maastricht summit would result in a clear and significant advance in European integration. . . . However, given its preferences for "more Europe", the government was prepared to compromise' (Garrett, 1994: 59). Second, he argues that even in the absence of these political goals Germany had an economic interest in seeing the EMU adopted. It hoped for a more stable successor to the European Monetary System to counterbalance the importance of the Japanese yen and the US dollar.

This latter claim is implicitly challenged by Sandholtz (1993). He states that none of the five perspectives that he discusses can alone explain the Maastricht bargain. Only one of these perspectives, however, focuses on the economic dimension of the EMU. In his view, an explanation based on the economic interests of the actors involved in the Maastricht negotiations has to be complemented by at least a partly political perspective, if not by other

perspectives as well. He explicitly rejects the idea that Germany had a predominant economic interest in the EMU and only agreed to compromise on the Maastricht Treaty thanks to concessions in other areas.

This perspective is questioned by Moravcsik (1998), who argues in his detailed analysis of the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty that the EMU closely reflects the most preferred outcome by the German government. When presenting the major aspects of the Maastricht Treaty (Moravcsik, 1998: 382–5), and the preferences of France, Germany and Britain he finds considerable differences. While he argues that package deals were used ‘sparingly’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 483) in the five big bargains he studies, he notes as exception the ‘German effort to link EMU to political union’. Nevertheless, ‘[t]he negotiations on political union were a sideshow to the monetary negotiations. They began much later, at German insistence, largely as a means of domestic political legitimization for the controversial monetary bargains’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 447). Obviously, if this latter holds true, studying the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty only from the angle of the EMU, as Milner (1997) does, is potentially misleading.

All these authors have rather strong positions with respect to what allowed for the successful negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. A shortcoming of their analyses is, however, that they only vaguely consider the ratification constraints imposed by the domestic ratification requirements and the preferences of the ratifying actors. When applying the concept of two-level games in international cooperation, they accordingly draw incomplete pictures of the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty in two ways: first, they do not examine the ratification processes in all member states; second, most of them assume the domestic constraints to be stable during the ratification process. Besides their incomplete discussion of the ratification provisions, most authors also fail to systematically and empirically derive the preferences for all relevant actors in the ratification stage. They reduce their analyses to either a specific set of member states or even a specific set of actors involved in the domestic ratification processes. Consequently, their diverging conclusions have to be accepted on the sole merit of their underlying argument. Our study attempts to bridge this gap by considering all domestic provisions and measuring empirically the preferences of the parliamentary parties involved in the ratification stage. We will combine both elements of domestic constraints, namely all domestic ratification provisions and the preferences of ratifying actors, to determine empirically the Maastricht win-set in each domestic arena.

## Elements of ratification constraints: provisions and policy positions

To analyze the 12 national ratification processes of the Maastricht Treaty we rely on a spatial solution concept. More precisely, we attempt to illustrate graphically what proposals would have found acceptance in the domestic parliaments, given the hurdles the proposal had to clear. We base our analyses on a series of simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the information we have on the political parties' stances with respect to the Maastricht Treaty accurately reflects the positions of the parliamentarians. We approach this assumption by checking different instruments for the measurement of their positions. Second, we assume that all parliamentarians of the same party have the same policy positions. Given the strong voting discipline in most European parties this is not a too unrealistic assumption. Third, we assume that the policy positions of the parliamentarians and the parties they represent are Euclidean. This implies that politicians prefer proposals closer to their ideal point, and that the utility for proposals declines as the distance from their policy position increases. Based on these assumptions a useful theoretical solution concept can be applied to determine the so-called 'win-set'. The win-set comprises all proposals that would find, given the ratification constraints, sufficient support to beat the status quo. To determine the Maastricht win-set in the 12 countries, we start by discussing in detail the domestic ratification provisions.

### Background of ratification provisions

The ratification provisions for international treaties vary widely from one member country to another. Generally, the role of domestic parliaments is central. Table 1 summarizes the involvement of the 12 domestic parliaments in the ratification of such treaties. A priori, the governments involved in the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty might have expected these parliamentary hurdles to be the most likely ones. As Milner (1997) suggests, however, these provisions can undergo changes after a treaty has been signed by the negotiators and enters the ratification stage. For this reason, we quickly discuss the details of the Maastricht ratification process in each country, before summarizing these stages in Table 2 on p. 102.

#### *Belgium*

International treaties have to be approved both by the Chamber and Senate. In addition, since the Maastricht Treaty also included elements that pertained to the authority of the Belgian Communities, the latter's Councils also had to approve the Treaty. Consequently, five separate votes (Chamber, Senate and

**Table 1** Parliamentary involvement in ratification processes

<i>Country</i>	<i>Ratification of international treaties by Parliament</i>
Belgium	'Not required but commercial treaties and those which affect rights of citizens must be approved by both Houses.'
Denmark	'Yes'
France	'Parliament must pass a law authorising the ratification of certain treaties.'
Germany	'Treaties regulating political relations of the Federation or relating to matters of federal legislation require Diet and Council consent in the form of a law. Some administrative agreements require the consent of the Council.'
Greece	'Yes.'
Ireland	'By the Dail when a charge on public funds is involved.'
Italy	'Yes.'
Luxembourg	'Yes, applying the same procedure as to adopt laws.'
Netherlands	'Treaties must be laid before Parliament for tacit (after 30 days) or explicit (no Bill) approval.'
Portugal	'Yes, in respect of matters with parliamentary competence, international organisations, friendship, peace, defence and boundaries.'
Spain	'Important treaties must be ratified under the Const. (articles 93 and 94). Parliament has to be advised of all others.'
United Kingdom	'No.'

*Source:* Interparliamentary Union (1986: 1246ff)

three Community Councils) had to approve the Treaty by simple majority. Given the compositions of the Community Councils and the large majorities obtained in all chambers, we will limit our analysis to the bicameral vote in the lower chamber and the Senate (Arts, 1993).<sup>1</sup>

### *Denmark*

The Danish constitution envisions two basic ratification procedures for treaties such as the Maastricht Treaty. Either a treaty is ratified by a five-sixths majority in parliament, or a referendum decides on the final fate of a treaty approved by less than the required supermajority in parliament (Giortler, 1993). Therefore, at the parliamentary level this supermajority is the highest hurdle for a ratification.

### *France*

The French constitution allows for ratification of international treaties by the President, by parliament or by referendum. In addition, the constitutional

court decided that the Maastricht Treaty was in conflict with several elements of the French constitution. Hence, also a constitutional change was necessary, which required a three-fifths majority in a joint session of the lower and upper house according to the so-called Congress method (Keraudren and Dubois, 1994). This three-fifths majority proved to be the highest parliamentary ratification hurdle, since the ratification vote itself required only a simple majority vote. President Mitterrand decided, however, to bypass this parliamentary vote by calling for a referendum.

### *Germany*

International treaties normally require approval by a simple majority of the Bundestag. Since the Maastricht Treaty touched on matters where both German Chambers have authority, the approval of the Bundesrat was also required. Corbett notes that '[a]fter some initial hesitation the government agreed . . . that the ratification required a constitutional amendment and therefore the approval both of the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* (each by a 2/3 majority)' (Corbett, 1993). Hence, instead of a simple majority vote the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty required bicameral approval with two-thirds majorities in both German chambers.

### *Greece*

According to the Greek constitution ratification of international treaties is among the powers of the executive (Ioannou, 1993). With respect to the Maastricht Treaty, Prime Minister Mitsotakis decided to request the approval of parliament, where a simple majority was required.

### *Ireland*

The Maastricht Treaty conflicted with dispositions in the Irish constitution. Consequently, a constitutional amendment was necessary which required first a vote in both chambers of parliament and then a referendum (Van Wijnbergen, 1994: 182), which was largely expected during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty. Based on the constitutional amendment, parliament then ratified the Treaty proper.

### *Italy*

International treaties are ratified by the President of the Republic after the Parliament has approved them (Daniele, 1993). Consequently, the parliamentary hurdle involved concurrent majorities in the two chambers.

### *Luxembourg*

The constitution requires that the Duke concludes treaties, but that they only become effective if approved by parliament, and this by simple majority.



Friden (1993) argues that a constitutional change, requiring the presence of three-quarters of the members of parliament and the support of a two-thirds majority, was also adopted. Pauly (1994) states that the constitution was modified, but without the normally required dissolution of parliament. Consequently, the two-thirds majority was the highest provision in parliament.

### *Netherlands*

Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty only required a simple majority in parliament (Den Hartog, 1994: 214), like all other bills. Consequently, bicameral approval by simple majority constituted the highest parliamentary hurdle.

### *Portugal*

While most international treaties require parliamentary approval, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty also hinged on constitutional changes. These changes have to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of parliament.<sup>2</sup> After these constitutional changes, and since the Maastricht Treaty implied participation in an international organization, the parliament had to approve it by simple majority (Marinho, 1994: 235). Nevertheless, the highest parliamentary hurdle was the two-thirds majority for the constitutional changes.

### *Spain*

According to Santacruz (1993: 247) the Maastricht Treaty contradicted the Spanish constitution, and, consequently, required a constitutional reform.<sup>3</sup> This partial reform had to find support of three-fifths majorities in each of the two chambers (Santacruz, 1993: 248). Given the reform, the Treaty could be adopted as an 'organic law' which requires an absolute majority in the lower house and a simple majority in the upper house for approval (Ibanez, 1994: 130). Nevertheless, the supermajority for the constitutional reform constituted the highest provision in parliament.

### *United Kingdom*

In order to become effective, international treaties have to be translated into British laws. Consequently, the British parliament had to approve all dispositions of the Treaty by simple majority.

This brief review shows that in several member countries the requirements changed during the parliamentary ratification process. Most of these changes were due to the need for constitutional changes induced by the Maastricht Treaty. They were not anticipated and required higher majority voting quota than the ratification of other international treaties. Table 2 summarizes the highest parliamentary hurdles which were necessary for the ratification of the

**Table 2** Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary ratification hurdles

<i>Country</i>	<i>Highest parliamentary hurdle</i>	<i>Extra-parliamentary hurdle</i>
Belgium	bicameral (simple majorities in both chambers)	
Denmark	unicameral (5/6 majority)	referendum
France	2/3 majority in Congress (upper and lower house reunited)	referendum
Germany	bicameral (2/3 majorities in both chambers)	
Greece	unicameral (simple majority)	
Ireland	bicameral (simple majority)	referendum
Italy	bicameral (simple majority in both chambers)	
Luxembourg	unicameral (2/3 majority)	
Netherlands	bicameral (simple majority in both chambers)	
Portugal	unicameral (2/3 majority)	
Spain	bicameral (3/5 majorities in both chambers)	
United Kingdom	bicameral (simple majority in both chambers)	

Maastricht Treaty. In addition we list further provisions, if these replaced or complemented the parliamentary ratification process.

By and large, we find a great variety in the domestic provisions for the Maastricht Treaty. In Denmark, there existed a very high five-sixths parliamentary hurdle for ratifying Maastricht, but a referendum still offered an exit option that might be comparable to the Greek hurdle of a unicameral simple majority quota. Germany, by contrast, imposed two two-thirds majorities without any referendum option. While most of the 12 member states required bicameral consent, only three allowed for a referendum. Moreover, their uni- and bicameral voting quota differed from simple majorities to two-thirds and five-sixths majorities, respectively. These findings show that the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty depended on very different provisions in the 12 member states. Almost all provisions imposed higher hurdles for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty than those for government formation.

To summarize, when proposing the Maastricht draft treaty to their domestic parliaments most member state governments had to cross higher hurdles than those that are required for their own formation. The variety of these provisions indicates that member states may use the ratification phase to varying degrees as a threat in the negotiating phase. For our analysis of the ratification process, however, these formal domestic provisions are not the only ingredients for deriving the win-sets of a draft treaty. Even in the most

extreme case, the highest hurdle of unanimity can be overcome when all ratifying actors are in favor of a draft proposal, while lower provisions may already threaten the survival of a negotiating government in case of large domestic opposition. Policy positions of ratifying actors are therefore the second element for our analysis. In order to determine the 12 domestic winsets of the Maastricht Treaty, we now turn to the measurement of the ratifying actors' policy positions.

### **Positions of the actors**

Since the draft treaty had to clear the parliamentary hurdle in all 12 member countries, we investigate policy positions of the political parties represented in the national parliaments. A series of instruments are used to determine the policy positions of political parties. Three of these instruments predominate in the literature on political parties (e.g. Gabel and Huber, forthcoming) and appear also in the context of research on parties in European integration. First, some authors rely on analyses of the policy programs of political parties. The Party Manifesto research project (Budge et al., 1987) has collected for most European countries and political parties data on the latter's position on various issues. Among them is one item measuring the number of positive and negative statements with respect to European integration. Second, other authors use expert interviews to measure the stances of political parties with respect to European integration (e.g. Ray, 1997). And finally, some other authors (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997) employ information from surveys (e.g. Eurobarometers) on party identifiers to infer the position of political parties.

All these instruments have advantages and disadvantages and are based on different assumptions. For our purpose, the third instrument proved the most advantageous, and this for several reasons. Both Party Manifesto and expert interview data available to us only give a general assessment of a party's policy position with respect to European integration. The Party Manifesto Project counts the number of positive and negative statements with respect to European integration appearing in electoral programs of political parties. Ray's (1997) expert interviews, on the other hand, only yield information on the parties' policy position on European integration and the latter's salience. Consequently, both instruments collect rather crude information on the parties' general policy positions and fail to give indications on policy positions for specific issues. Eurobarometer surveys, however, contain specific questions on several issues of the Maastricht Treaty. This allows us to infer much more specific policy positions. Moreover, the coverage, both of countries and parties, speaks in favor of Eurobarometer data. Ray's (1997) data and the Party Manifesto Project do not cover all member countries, and in

addition some parties present in domestic parliaments fail to appear in these datasets. While the latter is also the case for the Eurobarometer data, the problem is less acute. For these reasons we rely on information on party identifiers to infer the policy position of political parties with respect to the Maastricht Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

Using survey data to infer the parties' policy positions also is warranted for another, more substantive, reason. Carrubba (1998: 24) finds that – even where the public was uninterested and uninformed – parties responded to electoral pressure during the Maastricht process. Hence, survey responses are likely to pick up such effects, while this is much less likely with the other data sources. The survey we employ, namely the Eurobarometer 37, contains a series of questions relating to issues of the Maastricht Treaty. We use five questions which cover the domains of EMU, EU foreign policy and the role of the European Parliament.<sup>5</sup> Each question asked the respondent to state whether or not she was in favor of a particular disposition in the Maastricht Treaty. All five items reflect further moves to a more integrated European Union. Based on the answers of party identifiers to these five questions we attempt with a simple factor analysis to recover the salient dimensions of the ratification processes in the national parliaments and the actors' factor loading as their policy positions on the corresponding dimensions. The crucial question is of how to extract factors with regard to the demarcation of the sample and the selection of the factor number.

An initial factor analysis covering individuals from all countries assumes that a single dimension underlies the answers given to the five questions.<sup>6</sup> This factor basically recovers a general attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty, since all five items are heavily correlated with this factor (Table 3, last column).<sup>7</sup> To determine the 12 domestic win-sets, however, it seems to be more useful to extract factors for each country separately.

Extracting a single factor for each country suggests that differences between the countries are noticeable (Table 3). Except for Italy, the first two items that are linked to EMU are generally very similar in their weights, but the political items play a much smaller role in the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg. This means that a single-factor analysis covering individuals from all countries does not sufficiently reproduce the configuration of the ratifying actors' policy positions in the 12 domestic arenas. In addition, the country-specific analyses show that in at least three countries, namely Luxembourg, Ireland and the United Kingdom, a two-dimensional solution is preferable.

For these reasons it seems useful also to look at a two-dimensional space by forcing a two-dimensional solution in all countries (Table 4).<sup>8</sup> Employing an initial global factor analysis covering all countries, we find a first

**Table 3** One factor solution (factor loadings)

<i>question</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>tot</i>
CENTRAL BANK	.67	.74	.66	.77	.78	.73	.51	.68	.70	.70	.72	.78	.74
CURRENCY	.62	.78	.64	.77	.80	.75	.54	.63	.76	.66	.74	.69	.73
FOREIGN POLICY	.68	.73	.65	.64	.80	.58	.67	.57	.44	.73	.65	.62	.68
DEFENCE	.62	.75	.67	.55	.80	.60	.71	.56	.52	.76	.81	.66	.69
EP	.73	.70	.75	.73	.79	.69	.72	.72	.65	.75	.77	.75	.75
eigenvalue	2.22	2.75	2.27	2.44	3.15	2.27	2.03	2.01	1.95	2.60	2.75	2.48	2.58

*Notes:* B (Belgium), DK (Denmark), F (France), D (Germany), GR (Greece), IRL (Ireland), I (Italy), L (Luxembourg), NL (Netherlands), P (Portugal), E (Spain), UK (United Kingdom), tot (all 12 countries combined). The exact question wording for the 5 variables appears in the appendix.

dimension reflecting mostly the political issues in the list of items. The second dimension captures the information contained in the economic issues. Nevertheless, given the differences that appeared between countries in the one-factor solution we also employ country-specific analyses. These analyses largely reflect the global analysis, but an important difference appears for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Despite the fact that the five items employed contain two economic questions and three political ones, it appears that in these four countries the most important factor is of an economic and not of a political nature.

### Applying theoretical solution concepts to the Maastricht ratification

Given the results of our country-specific factor analyses we try to explore the Maastricht ratification stage both under the assumption of a one-dimensional policy space and the possibility of a two-dimensional space. We briefly discuss our analysis based on the assumption that we can represent the Maastricht Treaty in one-dimensional policy space. While we cover all countries in this analysis, we only present the important examples for the two-dimensional solution for space reasons. Before starting our analyses, a few general remarks should be made. First, an important element of the spatial analysis concerns the location of the status quo, which is central in determining the location and size of the win-set. We assume that the status quo corresponds to a

**Table 4** Two factor solution (factor loadings)

<i>question</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>tot</i>
first factor	pol	pol	pol	eco	pol	eco	pol	pol	eco	pol	pol	eco	pol
CENTRAL BANK	.17	.18	.19	.88	.29	.88	.19	.16	.81	.30	.42	.84	.20
CURRENCY FOREIGN POLICY	.11	.30	.12	.86	.33	.91	-.01	.09	.78	.15	.67	.90	.18
DEFENCE EP	.80	.81	.78	.27	.87	.08	.79	.84	.00	.66	.15	.09	.79
eigenvalue	2.22	2.75	2.27	2.44	3.15	2.27	2.03	2.01	1.95	2.60	2.75	2.48	2.58
second factor	eco	eco	eco	pol	eco	pol	eco	eco	pol	eco	eco	pol	eco
CENTRAL BANK	.82	.90	.79	.12	.86	.12	.58	.81	.00	.74	.65	.27	.85
CURRENCY FOREIGN POLICY	.83	.84	.85	.15	.83	.12	.88	.82	.16	.87	.33	.07	.86
DEFENCE EP	.12	.20	.09	.70	.22	.77	.08	-.05	.90	.35	.90	.79	.16
eigenvalue	.99	.85	.95	.97	.63	1.15	.95	1.02	.91	.79	.71	1.00	.87


*Notes:* B (Belgium), DK (Denmark), F (France), D (Germany), GR (Greece), IRL (Ireland), I (Italy), L (Luxembourg), NL (Netherlands), P (Portugal), E (Spain), UK (United Kingdom), tot (all 12 countries combined). The exact question wording for the 5 variables appears in the appendix.

position that reflects a negative answer to all five questions employed in the factor analysis. By symmetry we can identify the location of the Maastricht Treaty as corresponding to positive answers to all five questions.<sup>9</sup> Second, the policy spaces that we represent are not directly comparable from one country to the next. This is simply a consequence of adopting country-specific factor analyses. Third, when representing a two-dimensional policy space, we assume that the two dimensions recovered are of identical importance. Finally, we do not represent and label all ratifying actors' policy positions and indifference curves in the graphs that follow. We only depict the most important actors, namely those that are crucial in determining the location, size and shape of the win-sets.

### Maastricht in one dimension

We start our empirical investigation with the less general one-dimensional analysis. In Figure 1 we represent the win-sets (solid lines) of the status quo for all 12 member countries. The win-sets are determined by the location of the status quo (sq) and the ideal point of the pivotal party in the chambers of the national parliament. The labels of these pivotal parties appear in parenthesis. By construction the status quo lies to the left of all ideal-points of the parties, while the location of the Maastricht draft treaty (m) lies to their right. The critical question is whether the pivotal parties' distance to the status quo is larger than their distance to the Maastricht draft treaty. For the treaty to come into force, the pivotal parties of all 12 member countries should be closer to it than to the status quo.

In most countries, we find that the win-set of the status quo comprises the location of the Maastricht draft treaty. Only in Denmark and in the United Kingdom do the pivotal parties (Social Democrats and Conservatives respectively) prefer the status quo to the Maastricht draft proposal. In the Danish case the explanation can be found in the extremely high ratification hurdle in parliament, which required the accord of almost all political parties. Failing to clear this ratification hurdle, the government had to submit the Maastricht draft treaty to a referendum, which failed in its first attempt. In the British case the win-set is completely determined by the government party, which preferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty. Obviously, the opt-out clauses that the United Kingdom obtained in Maastricht and that were negotiated in Edinburgh for Denmark after the first referendum, might explain



**Figure 1** Win-sets in one dimension.  
 Note: Table 6 (in the appendix) lists all political parties, party labels and parties' full names.

why the ratification process succeeded all the same in both countries. Nevertheless, this 'additional' explanation of the British and the Danish results already highlights the limitation of a one-dimensional interpretation. Even though the analysis of the ratification process under the assumption of a one-dimensional policy space gives some interesting insights, it fails to give us any indication on the elements of the Maastricht Treaty that rendered the ratification problematic in some countries.

According to our one-dimensional solutions, the Maastricht Treaty had to fail in two countries. Moreover, we find that the weight of the two factors differed between Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on the one side and the remaining eight countries on the other side. This means that the draft treaty had different connotations in the domestic arenas. We therefore discuss the country-specific, two-dimensional analyses in more detail for some countries and also provide some additional information on the actual ratification processes in the parliaments.

### **Maastricht in two dimensions: some failures**

Among the two cases where our one-dimensional analyses suggest a ratification failure, Denmark is of central interest. On 12 May 1992, the Danish parliament accepted the Maastricht Treaty by 130 votes in favor, 25 against, one abstention and 23 absentees, but failed to clear the five-sixths-majority requirement based on the number of MPs. This negative outcome already found expression in the one-dimensional analysis, but the two-dimensional representation gives us some additional information. The political parties represented in the Danish parliament are distributed widely between the status quo and the Maastricht draft treaty (Figure 2). Combined with the high parliamentary ratification hurdle, namely a five-sixths majority, the Danish win-set of the status quo proves rather small and fails to comprise the Maastricht Treaty. While in the one-dimensional analysis we could rely on the notion of a pivotal party, whose vote proved crucial, in a two-dimensional space, a pivotal party does not necessarily exist. Hence, the win-set of the status quo corresponds to a collection of intersections among the indifference curves of various parties. Proposals in these intersections have the property of being preferred to the status quo by the required majority, in the Danish case by five-sixths of the 175 MPs.


As in the one-dimensional analysis, the size of the win-set in the Danish parliament is almost completely determined by the indifference curve of the Social Democrats (I[S]). The size and location of this win-set also clearly suggest that it was mostly the aspects of economic integration in the Maastricht draft treaty that caused problems. Figure 2 suggests that a proposal



limited to political integration would have easily satisfied the ratification provisions. The failure to clear the parliamentary hurdle forced the government to submit the draft treaty to a referendum which did not find majority support in the population on 2 June 1992.

After the adoption of the Edinburgh protocol another ratification debate in parliament became necessary, which consisted of a governmental proposal of three bills, namely the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the acceptance of the Edinburgh protocol, and a law requiring a binding referendum. On 30 March 1993, the Danish parliament accepted all three bills (Maastricht: 154 in favor, 16 against; Edinburgh and referendum bill: 153 in favor, 16 against) (Giortler, 1993; Laursen, 1994: 77). The Maastricht Treaty then easily cleared the five-sixths-majority requirement and strictly speaking no second referendum was necessary. This governmental success can largely be explained with the two-dimensional analysis. The economic dimension in this second parliamentary vote was largely curtailed by the Edinburgh agreement, allowing for an opt-out from the EMU. As noted above, restricting our two-dimensional graph to the political dimension suggests that the Maastricht Treaty was part of the parliamentary win-set.

The same economic dimension also appears as a stumbling block for the British parliamentary ratification process (Figure 3). While the ideal points of




**Figure 2** Denmark.

the British parties suggest that all of them moderately favored further political integration, they were heavily split concerning additional economic integration. Among them, especially the Conservatives appear to oppose further integrative moves in the economic arena. This party's policy position determines completely the parliamentary win-set of the status quo. The win-set comprises the policy positions of almost all parties, but fails to include the location of the Maastricht Treaty. Compared to the one-dimensional analysis, Figure 3 clearly illustrates that the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was only possible because the economic dimension was strongly reduced for the United Kingdom. By obtaining an opt-out of the EMU, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty reduced itself largely to the political dimension, an element which escaped completely our one-dimensional analysis. In accord with our two-dimensional analysis, the lower house consequently approved the relevant bills in their third reading on 20 May 1993 with 292 votes in favor and 112 against.<sup>10</sup> In the upper house the Treaty was approved by 141 votes in favor and 29 against on 20 July 1993 (Best, 1994: 272f).<sup>11</sup>

**Maastricht in two dimensions: some successes**

Apart from the one 'real' and the one 'almost' failure of the ratification process, all other parliamentary ratifications succeeded. All graphical analyses of the process based on a two-dimensional policy space show that the location of the




**Figure 3** United Kingdom.

Maastricht Treaty was comprised in the win-set of the status quo. In almost all cases the win-set was large, and even a restriction to a sole economic dimension would hardly have affected the positive outcomes of the ratification process. Nevertheless, we will present here for illustrative purposes the spatial analyses for Germany and France, both considered to affect crucially the fate of European integration. Germany is also an interesting case because Moravcsik (1998) emphasizes the importance of the political dimension for this country to go along with the Maastricht Treaty. France, on the other hand, appears to have emphasized the economic aspects, and President Mitterrand put the ratification in jeopardy by calling a referendum that almost failed.

Figure 4 depicts the policy positions of the parties represented in the German parliament. All ideal points are closely clustered and not too far away from the location of the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, they suggest, as Moravcsik (1998) implies, that German parties were strongly in favor of political integration. On the economic dimension, however, most of them are located somewhere in the middle between the status quo and the location of the Maastricht Treaty. Despite the high German provisions, namely two-thirds majorities in both chambers, the bicameral win-set is rather large (Figure 4).<sup>12</sup> It appears, however, that if the Maastricht Treaty had not included a political dimension, ratification would have been much more difficult. The Germans' reluctance to give up the Deutsche Mark for the untested Euro certainly is related to this result.

Given the linkage of political and economic integration, it cannot surprise that the constitutional amendment found large support in both chambers. The Bundestag approved the Maastricht Treaty on 2 December 1992 by 543 votes against 8 and 17 abstentions (Beuter, 1994: 95).<sup>13</sup> The Bundesrat followed suit on 18 December 1992 and approved the Treaty unanimously. This, however, did not suffice to avoid constitutional battles in court, which in the end proved to be fruitless.

The French ratification process provides illustration for changes in the ratification procedure. Given that the French constitutional court found that parts of the Maastricht Treaty were in conflict with the constitution, a constitutional change was necessary to pave the way for a successful ratification. This parliamentary hurdle, according to the so-called Congress method, consisted of a two-thirds majority of the upper and lower house reunited. The policy positions of the major parties all cluster at some distance from the status quo, closer to the Maastricht Treaty. Only the Communist party (PCF) and the Front National (FN) appear to have more critical stances with respect to the Maastricht Treaty. Given their numerical weakness in the joint session of upper and lower house they could not influence the size of the win-set. The latter proves to comprise the policy positions of all parties and also the Maastricht Treaty, as in the one-dimensional analysis.




**Figure 4** Germany.

Consequently, the French government had not to worry about the parliamentary ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The required constitutional change was adopted by the so-called Congress method on 23 June 1992, clearing easily the required three-fifths majority in a joint session of the lower and upper house.<sup>14</sup> Given this, even the required vote in parliament to ratify the Treaty proper would have hardly caused any problems. But after the negative Danish vote on 2 June 1992, President Mitterrand decided to call a referendum on the authorization of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, which was held on 20 September 1992 (Keraudren and Dubois, 1994: 152). Our analysis thus underlines again the narrowly avoided blunder of President Mitterrand, who called for a referendum, which allowed his opponents to stage a largely political campaign against him. Only with a slight popular majority, the Maastricht Treaty finally escaped the plebiscite trap (Schneider and Weitsman, 1996; Hug and Sciarini, 2000).

### *Summary*

For almost all 12 countries that ratified the Maastricht Treaty our analyses suggest that parliamentary ratification hardly restricted the negotiating



**Figure 5** France.

governments. In almost all countries, the domestic win-sets of the status quo were relatively large, included the policy positions of most political parties and lay systematically to the upper-right of the status quo. Such a location of the win-set indicates that further integrative moves along the economic and the political dimensions would find parliamentary support. In this respect, the location of the win-set of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal is very similar, which implies that their governments have a similar potential for further integration on both dimensions. The German and Dutch governments, however, are more restricted to political integration, since the parties of both countries fail to have a consensus on further monetary integration.

Exceptions to this rule appear only for Denmark and the United Kingdom. Given the high ratification hurdles in Denmark, it can hardly surprise that the win-set is vanishingly small and, in addition, fails to comprise proposals that would further economic integration. The size and location of this specific win-set heavily depends on policy positions of the parties. Hence, our analysis goes well together with the 'involuntary defection' in the Danish parliament, and also to some degree with the second 'involuntary defection'

in the first referendum. The opt-outs clarified in the Edinburgh protocol together with changes in the political constellation, apparently were sufficient to avoid a third 'involuntary defection' in the second referendum.

The United Kingdom is the second exception, and offers a contrast with the Danish reasons for ratification problems. Even though the British majoritarian system is considered to allow for high governmental flexibility, the parliamentary parties imposed severe constraints on the Maastricht ratification due to the small win-set.<sup>15</sup> Despite Britain's opt-out of most economic parts of the Maastricht Treaty, ratification could barely be achieved in parliament. The razor-thin majority of John Major's Conservatives and the overall stance of this party with respect to European integration, severely tied the hands of the British government.

Finally, another interesting result worth discussing is France's near 'involuntary defection' in the referendum. Judging from our analysis based on the parliamentary configuration, such an outcome would have hardly been expected. The difference between the parliamentary and the popular ratification procedure lies mostly in the lower majority requirement in the referendum (i.e. simple majority) and a different voting body. The first difference should lead to an even bigger win-set in a referendum. Given the narrow victory for the Maastricht Treaty, the different voting body appears to have made the difference. But since we used the voters' evaluation of the Maastricht Treaty to infer the positions of the parties, it is likely that the referendum campaign partly focused on elements unrelated to the Treaty. This reinforces, to a large degree, analyses that stress the possibility for voters to punish unpopular governments in referendums on European integration (Schneider and Weitsman, 1996; Hug and Sciarini, 2000).

## Conclusion

Our analysis of the ratification procedures of the Maastricht Treaty offers detailed insights into domestic constraints on the ratification of European bargaining results. These constraints – which are determined by both the policy positions of domestic actors and parliamentary provisions that are often higher than the requirements for domestic government formation – set limits to the governments' room for maneuver in the international arena. Compared to most analyses using the two-level concept of international cooperation, our comparative analysis tried to reveal how the combination between the policy positions of domestic political parties and various domestic provisions of European member states affected the Maastricht ratification process.

According to our findings, it is important to systematically investigate

both the actors' policy positions and the institutional provisions. Even in countries like the United Kingdom with rather low procedural hurdles, the survival of governments is threatened by proposing international draft treaties because the policy positions of the majority are in opposition to further integration. In other countries like Belgium or Germany with high formal checks-and-balances there is a broad consensus on further integration among almost all parties offering a large set of alternatives to change the status quo. The case of France, however, shows that governments either combine European with other policy matters or might not be fully informed about their potential to act. This detailed picture is best shown by a two-dimensional representation of the Maastricht draft treaty. Empirically, the different importance of political and economic issues suggests applying country-specific two-dimensional solutions. Theoretically, a two- or more dimensional formulation of draft proposals makes sense for two reasons. First, a higher dimensionality enables negotiating governments to link different objectives for political exchange. Such packages may particularly raise the likelihood for getting consent of all negotiators. Second, two- or more dimensional drafts may increase the likelihood for the survival of negotiating governments in their domestic arena. Under closed rule, negotiated proposals set a powerful agenda in a two – or more dimensional situation when majority voting has to be applied for ratification to take place.

Despite several setbacks during the Maastricht ratification procedures, the process of European integration continues. With the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 and the participation of the European Commission and the European Parliament it has enormously enlarged the set of actors negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1997. Our initial analyses of the delegates' position on more than 200 draft treaty issues indicate a higher dimensionality of the Amsterdam policy space. This suggests that governmental negotiators increased their bargaining set and decreased their domestic constraints. Combined with the less ambitious nature of the Amsterdam Treaty this may already explain to some degree why the ratification of this new integrative step proved less dramatic (Hug and König, 1999).

## Appendix

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In this appendix we report some background information with respect to the factor analyses carried out with the Eurobarometer data and some comparisons with other data sources. First, we reproduce the question wording for the variables employed in the factor analyses. Then, we discuss in more detail

the various steps that allow us to recover policy preferences for the various partisan actors. Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients between the factors based on the two types of factor analyses. Finally, Table 6 lists all political parties employed in this study and reproduces the party labels used in Figures 1–5 and the party’s full name.

### Questions used from Eurobarometer 37.0

Q.59 Following the meeting in Maastricht, the debate on European Union continues. Could you please tell me whether you are in favour or not, of . . . (SHOW CARD – READ OUT)

Q.59\_1 As an Economic and Monetary Union, the European Community having a common European Central Bank, with the heads of national central banks on its board of Directors.

Q.59\_2 (Attitudes towards European Union issues)

Within this European Economic and Monetary Union, a single common currency replacing the different currencies of the Member States in five or six years time.

Q.59\_3 (Attitudes towards European Union issues)

As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC.

Q.59\_4 (Attitudes towards European Union issues)

As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence.

Q.59\_5 (Attitudes towards European Union issues)

The European Parliament having the right to decide together with the Council of Ministers representing the national governments, on the legislation of the European Community.

1. In favour
2. Not in favour
3. DK
0. NA

D.2 Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? (IF YES) Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close or merely a sympathiser?



1. Very close
2. Fairly close
3. Merely a sympathiser
4. Close to no particular party

### Additional information on factor analyses, other measures of policy preferences and party labels

The answers to these five questions were recoded to reflect positive (1) and negative (-1) feelings with respect to the various aspects of the Maastricht Treaty. A principal component analysis, first forcing a one-dimensional solution was carried out. Given the differences across countries a two-dimensional solution was also imposed. The two factors of the initial solution were then obliquely rotated. In both cases we obtained scores for each individual factor by the regression method. These individual factor scores were then aggregated in mean positions for each party in each country. The command file, as well as the resulting data file appear on the web at <http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/staff/simon/ratif/>.

We compared the results of our factor scores with the measurements of

**Table 5** Correlation between different measurements

	<i>POS92</i>	<i>SAL92</i>	<i>MPOS</i>	<i>MIMP</i>	<i>EB1</i>	<i>EB2</i>	<i>EBB1</i>
<i>POS92</i>	1.00	.46	.71	.32	.31	.48	.51
	79	79	41	41	71	71	71
<i>SAL92</i>	.46	1.00	.16	.31	.25	.27	.36
	79	79	41	41	71	71	71
<i>MPOS</i>	.71	.16	1.00	.55	.37	.30	.40
	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
<i>MIMP</i>	.32	.31	.55	1.00	.16	.24	.22
	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
<i>EB1</i>	.31	.25	.37	.16	1.00	.05	.88
	71	71	41	41	75	75	75
<i>EB2</i>	.48	.27	.30	.24	.05	1.00	.43
	71	71	41	41	75	75	75
<i>EBB1</i>	.51	.36	.40	.22	.88	.43	1.00
	71	71	41	41	75	75	75

*Notes:* POS92, SAL92 (position and salience derived from Ray (1997)); MPOS, MIMP (position and importance of European integration issue, according to the Party Manifesto Project); EB1, EB2 (first and second factor from individual factor analyses of Eurobarometer data); EBB1 (unique factor from one-factor analysis of Eurobarometer data).

preferences derived from two other sources. Ray (1997) provides for 1992 measures for the position (POS92) of a series of political parties on the European integration issue, as well as the latter's salience (SAL92). For the data from the Party Manifesto Project we used the proportion of positive statements among all statements on European integration as a measure of a party's position (MPOS). The importance of European integration in a party's program was measured by the proportion of statements on European integration among all coded statements (MIMP). Table 5 depicts the correlation between these measures, where EB1 and EB2 are the factor scores employed in the main text, while EBB1 and EBB2 are the factor scores based on the global factor analysis covering all countries.

**Table 6** Party labels

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Parties</i>
<b>Belgium</b>		<b>Germany</b>	
PS	Socialist Party (Wallon)	CDU/CSU	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
SP	Socialist Party (Flemish)	SPD	Social Democratic Party
ECOLO	Ecologists (Wallon)	FDP	Free Democratic Party
AGALEV	Ecologists (Flemish)	Greens	The Greens
PVV	Liberal Party (Flemish)	PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
PRL	Liberal Party (Wallon)		
PSC	Christian Social Party		
CVP	Christian Peoples Party		
VB	Flemish Bloc		
<b>Denmark</b>		<b>Greece</b>	
S	Social Democrats	PASOK	Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement
RV	Radical Party	ND	New Democracy
KF	Conservatives	SAP	Left Progressive Alliance/(KKI)
CD	Centre Democrats	IE	Ecologists Alternatives
SF	Socialist Peoples Party		
KRF	Christian Peoples Party		
V	Liberals		
FP	Progress Party		
<b>France</b>		<b>Ireland</b>	
PCF	French Communist Party	FF	Warriors of Destiny
PS	Socialist Party	FG	Tribe of Gaels
MRG	Radical Left Movement	LAB	Labour
UDF	French Democratic Union	WP	Workers Party
RPR	Rally for the Republic	Greens	Greens
FN	National Front	PDP	Progressive Democratic Party

**Table 6** *Contd.*

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Parties</i>
<b>Italy</b>		<b>Portugal</b>	
DC/PP	Christian Democrats/ Popular Party	CDU	Unified Democratic Coalition
PDS	Democratic Party of the Left	CDS	Social Democratic Center
PC	Communist Party	PS	Socialist Party
PSI	Italian Socialists	PSD	Social Democratic Party
MSI/AN	National Alliance	PSN	National Solidarity Party
PR	Republican Party	<b>Spain</b>	
PSDI	Italian Social Democratic Party	PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers Party
Verdi	The Green List	PP	Popular Party
LEGA	Northern League	CDS	Democratic and Social Center
<b>Luxembourg</b>		IU	United Left
GAP	Green Alternative	CIU	Convergence and Union
GLEI	Green Left Ecological Initiative	PNV	Basque Nationalist Party
A5/6	Action Committee 5/6	EA	Basque Unity
LSAP-POS	Workers' Party	HB	United People
DP/PD	Democratic Party	EE	Basque Left
CSV/PCS	Christian Social Party	PA	Andalusian Party
<b>Netherlands</b>		<b>United Kingdom</b>	
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	CON	Conservative Party
PvDA	Labour Party	LAB	Labour Party
VVD	Liberal Party	SDLP	Social Democratic Labour Party
D'66	Democrats 66	SLD	Social and Liberal Democrats
Links	Green Left	SNP	Scottish National Party
SGP	Political Reformed Party	Plaid Cymru	Welsh Nationalist Party
GPV	Reformed Political Union	ULST	Ulster Unionists
RPF	Reformed Political Federation		
CD	Center Democrats		
PR	Radical Political Party		

**Notes**

Data can be downloaded at <http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/staff/simon/maastricht.htm>

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- 1 This simplification is not too problematic, because at that time the three Community Councils were composed of the MPs of the national parliament, but meeting separately (Deschouwer, 1998).
- 2 Since only amendments were required, a two-thirds majority in parliament was sufficient (Marinho, 1994: 233f).
- 3 Ibanez (1994: 130) argues to the contrary and suggests that the constitutional reform adopted was not necessary for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In our analysis we assume that a constitutional amendment was necessary for adopting the draft treaty.
- 4 To some degree this reflects also the approach chosen by Gabel and Huber (forthcoming) who take voter preferences from Eurobarometers as one of the instruments against which they check various methods to extract policy positions from the party manifesto dataset. We compare in the appendix the positions that we recover from the Eurobarometer data with those derived from the Party Manifesto Project and Ray's (1997) dataset.
- 5 We only employ these five questions, since no other aspects of the Maastricht Treaty were addressed in the same question format in this survey. The exact question wording appears in the appendix.
- 6 This judgment is based on the Kaiser-criterion, which eliminates all factors with eigenvalues smaller than 1. We discuss our empirical strategy with respect to the factor analyses in more detail in the appendix.
- 7 As Table 5 (Appendix) suggests, this factor is mostly correlated with the position variable of Ray's (1997) data and the equivalent of the Party Manifesto data. We refrain from offering a discussion on how these factors relate to recent work on the policy dimensions in the European Union. Given our focus on national ratification processes and the differences we detect across countries, such comparisons would be of little value.
- 8 Our analysis here relies on an exploratory factor analysis (details in appendix). While in the one-dimensional case the differences between exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis are irrelevant, this might differ in the two-dimensional case. Even though we carried out confirmatory factor analyses, we rely in our analyses on the results of the exploratory analyses. The latter uses a series of possibly problematic assumptions, but the confirmatory analyses would also require additional restrictions, given our assumptions that the two factors are uncorrelated. Hence, we faced a trade-off between analyses

based on two different sets of restrictive assumptions, and decided to report and use the results of the exploratory factor analyses.

- 9 Obviously, this construction implies that all parties are located somewhere between the status quo and the location of the Maastricht draft treaty (provided all items load with the same sign on the factors), since not all party sympathizers share the same positive or negative opinion with respect to the five questions they answered. While this is in part an artificial solution, we find that it reflects accurately the ratification processes. In an earlier version of this paper we assumed that the status quo corresponds to a neutral position with respect to all five questions. Obviously, such an alternative determination of the status quo may lead to differently shaped win-sets, but the basic substantive interpretation of our results remained virtually the same.
- 10 A subsequent vote concerned the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, where the Major government succeeded only after linking it to a vote of confidence.
- 11 The tallies reported by Szyszczak (1993: 541–44) differ considerably and seem to have been mixed up with secondary votes.
- 12 While determining the win-set of the lower house is unproblematic, the upper house causes some problems, since in this chamber the governments of the *Länder* are represented and vote en bloc. We resorted to a simple but potentially problematic solution when partitioning the number of votes of each *Land* roughly according to the partisan composition of its government. Then, we added up the number of votes attributed to each party and determined on this basis the win-set of the *Bundesrat*.
- 13 Crossland (1993) reports 8 abstentions and 17 votes against, but Corbett (1993: 95) confirms Beuter's figures.
- 14 With 679 members of parliament present and 665 votes, the required majority was 399. The constitutional amendment passed with 592 votes in favor and 73 against (see *Ratification of the Treaty on European Union*, 1996). Another way to adopt the constitutional reform would have consisted of two separate votes in the two houses followed by a referendum (Cohen, 1993: 234).
- 15 The role of dissenting back-benchers is only partly addressed here. To some degree it is likely that parliamentary approval was held hostage to strong anti-EU back-benchers, as illustrated in the first parliamentary vote, where John Major failed to find a majority. Only when linking the ratification to a vote of confidence was the Prime Minister able to coerce his party to support the Maastricht Treaty.

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